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COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
Proposal  for  a 
COUNCIL  DIRECTIVE 
I 
COMC90)  141  final-SYN'257 
Brussels,  23  May  1990 
on  capital  adequacy  of 
investment  firms  and  credit  institutions 
(presented  by  the  Commission) EXPLANATORY  MEMORANDUM 
GENERAL  CONSIDERATIONS 
1.  The  present  proposal  for  a  Directive  on  the  Capital  AdeQuacy  of 
Investment  Firms  and  Credit  Institutions  Is  a  necessary  follow-up  to  the 
proposal  for  a  Directive on  Investment  Services  In  the securities field, 
presented  by  the  Commission  to  the  Councl I  on  3 ·January  1989  (on  which 
there  Is  a I ready  an  amended  proposa I  presented  by  the  Comm Iss Jon  on  8 
February.  1990  after  the  advice  of  the  European  Pari lament  and  the 
Economic  and  Social  Committee). 
The  proposal  for  a  directive on  Investment  Services  Is  Intended  to  open 
the  way  for  Investment  firms  authorized  In  their  home  Member  States  to 
have  access  to  all  other  Member  States'  financial  markets- either  by 
establishing  branches,  or  by  providing  services,  therein- on  the  basis 
of  certain  conditions  that  closely  follow  those  established  for  credit 
Institutions  In  the  Second  Banking  Coordination  Directive,  adopted  In 
December  1989.  AccordIng  to  the  programme  set  out  In  the  WhIte  Paper 
"Completing  the  Internal  Market",  these  freedoms  should  be  based  on 
coordination  of  key  rules  as  regards  the  authorization  and  the  on-going 
supervision of  financial  Institutions. 
2.  The  coordination  must  be  such  as  to  ensure  that  the  main  objective  of 
the  proposal  - to  ensure  that  both  the  health of  the  general  financial 
system  and  Individual  Investors  are  adeQuately  protected  In  the  new 
Integrated  European  market  - Is  achieved.  It  should  also  meet  two - 2  -
other  goals.  First,  It  should  establish  a  broadly  level  playing  field 
between  non-bank  Investment  firms  and  credit  Institutions  trading  In  the 
securities  markets.  Consistently  with  this  objective,  the  rules  set 
out  In  the  proposed  Direct lve  should  not  provide  an  Incant lve  for  an 
Investment  firm  to  opt  for  one  Institutional  structure,  e.g.  that  of  a 
credit  Institution- rather  than  another.  Second,  the  Directive  should 
enhance,  or  at  I east  not  ImpaIr ,  the  attract I veness  of  Europe  as  a 
financial  centre. 
Capital  regylrements  for  Investment  firms  which  are  not  credit 
I nst I tyt Ions 
3.  The  proposal  establishes  minimum  Initial  capital  requirements  for 
Investment  firms  which  are  not  credit  Institutions,  requirements  for  the 
latter being  already  fixed  by  the  Second  Banking  Directive.  These  have 
been  set  at  levels  which  ensure  that  when  It  starts  Its activities,  an 
Investment  firm  has  sufficient,  Initial  financial  resources  In  view  of 
the  nature  of  Its  business  and  second,  which  do  not  form  unnecessary 
barriers  to  the  entry  Into  the  market  of  new  firms.  Accordingly, 
dIfferent  amounts  are  estab I I shed  for  dIfferent  kInds  of  1  nvestment 
firms,  taking  Into  account  the  types of  business  carried out  by  them. 
4.  The  Initial  capital  requirements  for  firms  which  are  not  credit 
Institutions  are  lower  than  those  laid  down  for  credit  Institutions  In 
the  Second  Banking  Coordination  Directive.  This  Is  for  two  reasons. 
First,  Investment  firms  which  are  not  credit  Institutions  typically  are 
more  special !zed  than  credit  Institutions;  the  latter  engage  In  a  wider 
variety  of  activities  and  thus  need  higher  Initial  capital.  Second, 
under  Annex  5  of  the  present  Directive,  Investment  firms  which  are  not 
credit  Institutions  are  also  required  to  hold  "base  capital"  equivalent 
to  three  months'  of  their  fixed  overheads,  a  requirement  which  takes 
account  of  the  wide  variation  In  the  size of  non-bank  Investment  firms. 
5.  In  order  to  provide  for  the  ongoing  financial  soundness  of  such  firms, 
capital  requirements  are  set-to cover  the  market  risks  to which  they  are 
exposed. - 3  -
5.1  The  first  requirement  Is  the  position  risk  requirement  (Annexes  1 
and  2).  According  to  the  rules proposed,  each  firm  must  keep  In  the 
form  of  capital  a  certain  percentage  of  Its  long  and  short 
positions,  after  allowance  has  been  made  for  hedging  and  netting. 
This  percentage varies according  to  the nature of  the  Instruments  In 
which  the  firm  has  a  position  and  according  to  the  credit-standing 
of  the  Issuers concerned.  This  requirement  Is  Intended  to cover  the 
risk  of  adverse  price  movements  In  the  underlying  securities 
whatever  their  cause  (e.g.  Interest  rate  risk  changes  or  shifts  !n 
an  Issuer's credit worthiness). 
5.2 Second,  there  Is  a  foreign  exchange  risk  requirement  which  Is  set  In 
relation  to  a  firm's  vulnerability  to  losses  arising  purely  from 
adverse  exchange  rate movements.  This  Is  laid  down  In  Annex  .4. 
5.3 The  third  requirement  relates  to  unsettled  transactions,  I.e.  to 
transactions  In  which  one  or  other  party  has  not  paid  for  the 
securities  It  has  contracted  to  buy  or  not  del lvered  the. securities 
It  has  contracted  to  sell.  ~n  such  a  situation,  there  Is  a  risk 
that  the  counterparty  wll I  not  be  .able  to carry out  Its obi lgatlons 
and  also a  risk of  a  malfunctioning of  the  settlement  system  Itself; 
In  either of  these  cases  the  firm  may  suffer  a  loss. 
5.4 Finally  there  Is  the  "base"  requirement  In  Annex  5,  under  which  each 
firm  Is  required  to  hold  own  funds  equivalent  to one  quarter  of  the 
previous  year's  fixed  overheads.  This  requirement  Is  .Intended  fo 
cover  alI  other  risks  faced  by  Investment  firms,  e.g.  the  risk  that 
market  turnover  co I I  apses  reducIng  a  fIrm· s  .brolc I  ng  Income  to  a 
level  Insufficient  to cover  Its expenses. - 4  -
Capital  reaulrements  for  credit  Institutions 
6.  The  scope  of  the  proposed  Directive  extends  to alI  credit  Institutions, 
Including  those  which  are  not  Investment  firms.  This  Is  because  several 
of  the  main  risks  dealt  with  by  the  Directive,  such  as  the  risk  of 
losses  from  Interest  rate  and  exchange  rate  movements,  apply  to  their 
traditional  activities such  as  deposit  taking  and  lending,  as  wei  I  as  to 
their  Investment  business.  In  conseQuence  not  only  should  the  entire 
business of  credit  Institutions which  are  Investment  firms  be  supervised 
In  respect  of  these  risks,  but  also  that  of  those  which  are  not 
Investment  firms. 
7.,  As  regards  provision  against  marke>  risks  on  securities  positions,  the 
Directive  has  to  take  account  of  the  capital  reQuirements  Imposed  by  the 
Solvency  Ratio  Directive  (Councl I  Directive  89/647/EEC),  which 
Implicitly  make  some  provision  for  risks  other  than  credit  risks.  It 
would  thus  be  Inappropriate  to  reQuire  credit  Institutions  already 
meeting  the  Solvency  Ratio  Directive  to  provide  additional  capital 
against  market  risk  In  general;  to  do  so  would  put  them  at  a 
disadvantage  In  comparison  with  non-bank  Investment  firms  from  elsewhere 
In  the  Community  and  In  third countries. 
8.  The  Directive  therefore  offers  a  choice  of  two  main  options  In  respect 
of  credit  Institutions.  Under  both  of  these  options,  all  credit 
Institutions are  reQuired  to  :-
(I)  provide  additional  capital  against  foreign  exchange  risk  In 
accordance  with  the  rules  laid  down  In  Annex  4,  unless  their 
foreign  currency  open  positions  are  subject  to  a  I lmlt 
calculated as  a  percentage  of  their  own  funds  (Article 4  (2)). 
(This  Is  necessary  because  the  Solvency  Ratio  Directive  does 
not  expl lcltly take  account  of  foreign  currency  risks); 
(I I)  set  up  theIr  own  systems  to  monItor  and  centro I  market  rIsks 
(other  than  foreign  currency  risk)  on  their  overall  business 
(Article  4  (3); - 5  -
9.  However,  as  regards  market  risk on  open  positions  In equities  and  fixed-
rate  securities  and  counterparty  risk,  Article  4  (4)  allows  the 
supervIsory  authorItIes  In  each  Member  State  to  choose  between  two 
alternative approaches:  -
eIther  (a)  to  continue  to  apply  the  requirements  of  the  Solvency 
Ratio Directive; 
(b)  to  set  capital  requirements  on  the  short-term  "trading 
books"  of  credit  Institutions.  calculated  In  accordance 
with  the  rules  for  non-credit  Institutions  as  set  out  In 
Annexes  1  - 3  of  the  DIrectIve  In  substItution  for  the 
requirements  of  the  Solvency  Ratio  Directive.  For  this 
purpose  a  definition  of  the  "trading  book"  Is  given  In 
Article  2  of  the  Directive. 
10.  The  superv.lsory  authorities of  credit  Institutions may  choose  either  to 
apply one  of  the options  to alI  the  credit  Institutions  In  their  charge, 
or  to  decide  which  of  their  credit  Institutions  should  apply  which 
system  on  a  case-by-case  basis. 
11.  The  provision of  the  "trading  book"  option  allows credit  Institutions to 
have  their  capital  requirements  In  this area of  business  measured  In  the 
same  way  as  Investment  firms  which  are  not  credit  Institutions.  In  this 
way  the  trading  book  option  Is  consistent  with  the  goal  of  ensuring  a 
broadly  level  playing  field  between  those  Investment  firms  which  are, 
and  those  which  are  not,  credit  Institutions.  It  Is  also  desirable  on 
prudential  grounds,  because  the  requirements  In  Annexes  1  to  3  provide  a 
more  comprehensive  treatment  of  the  various  risks  In  Investment  services 
business  than  the  Solvency  Ratio  Directive,  which  Is  mainly  concerned 
with  credit,  as  opposed  to market,  risks. - 6  -
Own  Resources 
12.  The  definition  of  "own  resources"  for  credit  Institutions,  and 
Investment  fIrms  whIch  are  not  credIt  I nst I tut Ions,  1  s  dea It  wl th  In 
Annex  6  of  the  Directive.  In  the  case  of  credit  Institutions  the 
definition  Is  the  same  as  that  laid  down  In  Councl I  Directive 
NQ  89/299/EEC.  This  definition  Is  dictated  by  the  need  to  ensure  the 
long-run  solvency  of  credit  Institutions  - a  need  based  In  part  on  the 
IlliQuid  nature  of  most  of  their  assets- In  order  to  realize  the 
fundamental  supervisory  goals  of  depositor  protection  and  the  stab! I lty 
of  the  financial  system. 
13.  However  Member  States  may  permit  credit  Institutions  under  the  "trading 
book"  option  to  use  an  alternative  definition  of  "own  resources"  with 
regard  to  the  requirements on  their  trading  books.  This  Includes  a  much 
higher  proportion of  subordinated  debt  than  In  the  previous  definition, 
though  a  ceiling  Is  placed  on  such  debt  so  that  the  lcey  supervisory 
goals  are  not  compromised.  The  provision of  the  alternative  definition 
allows  such  credit  Institutions  to  more  easily  meet  the  volatile  own 
resources  requirements  associated  with  their  trading  positions,  and 
ensures  that  the  nature  of  theIr  own  resources  Is  broad I  y  s lm I I  ar  to 
that  for  Investment  firms  which  are  not  credit  Institutions  using  the 
"alternative definition"  described  In  paragraph  14. 
14.  The  competent  authorities may  apply  the definition of  "own  resources"  ·In 
Council  Directive  89/299/EEC  to  this  latter  group,  or  an  •alternative 
definition".  This  alternative  definition  Is  focussed  more  on  liquidity 
than  solvency;  thus  I II lquld  assets  are  deducted  In  ful I  from  capital, 
but  a  greater  amount  of  subordinated  debt  Is  allowed.  The  highly  I lquld 
nature  of  such  firms'  assets  means  that  requiring  them  to  provide 
capital  In  this  form  against  the  risks  they  run  Is  fully  consistent with 
the  fundamental  obJectives of  securities market  supervisors.  It  Is  also 
In  I lne  with  the  approach  adopted  by  US  securities market  supervisors. - 7  -
COMMENTS  ON  THE  INDIVIDUAL  ARTICLES 
Article  1 
15.  This  provides  for  all  Investment  firms,  as  defined  In  the  Council 
Directive  on  Investment  Services  ( .. ./  ...  EEC),  and  for  all  credit 
lnstltut1ons  subject  to  the  requirements  of  the  Councl I  Directive  on  a 
Solvency  Ratio  for  Credit  Institutions  89/647/EEC,  to  be  within  the 
scope  of  this Directive. 
Article  2 
. 16.  This  Article defines  certain  terms  used  In  the 'Directive,  which  are  not 
defined or  explained  In  the  Investment  Services Directive. 
Article  3 
17.  Levels  of  Initial  and  minimum  capital  are  laid  down  here  for  Investment 
firms  that  are  not  credit  institutions.  The  purpose  of  such 
requirements  Is  to  ens~re  that  such  firms  have  enough  starting  capital 
to  begin  business  In  the  provision  of  the  services  they  have  been 
authorized  to  supply.  Two  categories  of  such  firms  are.  however, 
excluded  from  both  these  obligations  and  the  business-related 
requirements  referred  to  In  Article  4.  These  are  local  firms  and 
Investment  advisers.  They  are  excluded  because  their  failure  poses  no 
threat  to  Investors,  or  to  the  general  stab! I lty  of  the  financial 
system. 
18.  Allowance  Is  made  for  firms  In  existence  at  the  time  the  Directive  Is 
Implemented  which  fa! I  to meet  the  minimum  levels stipulated  for  them  In 
the  Article,  and  also  for  firms  whose  Initial  capital  fa! Is  short  after 
Its  Implementation  due  to  losses.  These  provisions  broadly mirror  those 
In  the  Second  BankIng  Coord I  nat !on  DIrectIve.  a I though  an  add It lona I 
clause  allows  very  small  firms  to  continue  In  existence  In  cases  where, 
as  a  result of  the  death of  the owner.  control  shifts to an  heir. - 8  -
Article 4 
19.  This  Article  describes  In  general  terms  the  financial  requirements  for 
firms  covered  by  the  Directive.  An  Important  distinction  Is  made 
between  those  Investment  firms  which  are  not  credit  Institutions  and 
those  which  are.  The  former  firms  are  required  to  put  up  capital 
against  each  of  the  rlslcs  Identified  In  the  Directive,  In  the  manner 
Ia I  d  down  In  Annexes  1  to  5.  TheIr  over  a II  requIrement  Is  the  sum  of 
the  requirements  laid  down  In  each of  these  Annexes. 
20.  The  requirements  for  credit  Institutions  differ  In  a  number  of  respects 
from  those  for  non-banks.  First,  by  contrast  to  Investment  firms  which 
are  not  credit  Institutions,  they  are  not  required  to  provide  capital 
against  the  'other  risks'  catered  for  In  Annex  5,  such  as  the  risk  of  a 
fall  In  general  market  turnover  and  an  Individual  bank's  broklng  Income 
falling  with  lt.  This  exclusion  Is  justified  on  the  basis  that  such 
rlslcs  are  de  minimis  for  most  credit  Institutions,  whereas  they  are 
often  of  paramount  Importance  for  other  Investment  firms.  Second,  In 
regard  to  their  credit  Institutions,  Member  States  may  choose  to  Impose 
a  I lmlts,  Instead  of  a  capital  requirements,  system,  to  protect  against 
foreign  exchange  risk.  The  provision  of  the  limits  option  Is 
justifiable  because  the  capital  requirements  In  the  Solvency  Ratto 
DIrectIve  a I  ready  take  some  account  of  thIs  r I  sic.  ThIrd,  a II  credIt 
Institutions  are  obliged  to  establish  Internal  systems  to  monitor  and 
control  the  market  risks associated with  their  business  In  toto,  and  not 
simply  those  associated  with  their  securities  trading  activities. 
Finally,  t.4ember  States  supervisors  are  given  the  choice  of  Imposing 
either  the  Solvency  Ratio  Directive  requirements  to  their  credit 
Institutions'  trading  activities  In  bonds  and  equities,  or  the 
requirements  for  non-banks  detal led  In  Annexes  1  to  3. - 9  -
Article 5 
21.  A mark-to-market  valuation of  positions on  a  dally  basis  Is  required  by 
this  Article,  except  In  the  case  of  credit  Institutions  which  are 
subject  to  the  Solvency  Ratio  Directive  requirements  on  all  of  their 
business. 
Art lcle 6 
22.  This  Article  lays  down  both  the  type,  and  the  frequency,  of  the 
Information  a  firm  must  provide  Its competent  authorities. 
Article 7 
23.  Under  this  Article  ~ember  States  are  required  to  nominate  one  or  more 
authorities  to  grant  authorizations  and  to  carry  out  the  various 
supeivlsory  tasks envisaged  by  the Directive. 
24.  It  stipulates  that  It  Is  also  open  to  a  ~ember  State  to  nominate 
professional  associations  to  aet  In  this  role,  provided  that  their 
status  Is  recognized  In  the  overal I  statutory  scheme  of  supervision  In 
the  country  concerned. 
25.  Where  several  authorities  have  been  nominated  In  a  given  ~ember  State 
for  the  purposes of  the  Directive  they  are  required  to  cooperate  closely 
In  order  to ensure  an  adequate  level  of  supervision. 
Article 8 
26.  This  Article  permits  amendments  to  be  made  to  the  Directive's  rules  In 
certain  areas  by  use  of  a  committee  procedure.  It  Is  modelled  upon 
Article  22  of  the  Second  Banking  Directive. - 10  -
THE  ANNEXES 
27.  Annexes  1  to  5  describe  how  the  risks  In  a  firm's  positions,  and  thus 
the  capital  required  to  safeguard  It,  are  to  be  calculated,  whl  le  Annex 
6  deals  with  the  composition of  the  capital  that  Is  to  be  provided. 
Annex  1 
28.  This  Annex  explains  how  firms'  net  positions  are  to  be  measured, 
Including  the  conditions  under  which  gross  positions  In  an  Instrument 
may  be  reduced  by  the  holding  of offsetting positions  In  either  the  same 
Instrument  or  a  derivative  of  it.  Once  measured,  the  net  positions  are 
subject  to  the  capital  requirements  set  out  In  Annexes  2  and  4. 
29.  The  Annex  allows  for  a  degree  of  flexlbl I lty  In  the  way  In  which  options 
and  swaps are  treated. 
Annex  2 
30.  This  Annex  explains  how  capital  requirements  on  fixed  rate  Instruments 
and  equities are  to  be  calculated.  Lower  requirements  are  set  on  paper 
Issued  by  'qual lfylng'  firms  from  the  private  sector  than  on. that  from 
other  firms,  In  view  of  the  lower  price  volatility  of  the  former. 
Qual lfylng  Issuers  Include  credit  Institutions,  and  private sector  firms 
whose  securities  are  I lsted  on  Member  State,  or  recognized  third 
country,  stock  exchanges.  This  Annex  also  permits  the  use  of 
alternative  systems  for  measuring  capital  requirements  that  are  based 
on  the mathematical  concept  of  duration,  In  certain circumstances. - _11  -
Annex  3 
31.  This  Annex  covers  the  rlslc  to  a  firm  of  a  deal  It  has  entered  Into  not 
being settled for  whatever  reason,  for  example  the  counterparty  Involved 
falling  to  meet  Its  side  of  the  bargain,  or  a  malfunctioning_ of  the 
settlement  system.  It  explains  the  method  of  calculating  the  capital 
required  to  provide  a  buffer  against  the  losses arising  In  such  cases. 
Annex  4 
32.  This  Annex  describes  the  calculation  of  the  foreign  exchange  rlslc 
requIrement.  The  purpose  of  thIs  requIrement  Is  to  provIde  a  capIta I 
buffer  against  losses arising  from  adverse  movements  In  foreign  exchange 
rates  when  the  credit  Institution  or  Investment  firm  has  an  open 
position.  The  method  of  calculation  Is  also  used  In  calculating  foreign 
exchange  limits  for  credit  Institutions  If ·the  competent  authorities  so 
require  under  Article 4. 
Annex  5 
33.  Capital  requirements  are  set  In  this  Annex  to  safeguard  firms  against 
the  diverse  rlslcs  that  are  not  addressed  by  Annexes  2  to 4,  for  example 
the  losses arising  from  a  marlcet-wlde  fal I  In  turnover. 
Annex  6 
34.  Annex  6  Is  concerned with  the  definition of  this capital  or  'own  funds'. 
It  gives  the  competent  authorities  In  each  Member  State  the  option  of 
applying  the  definition of  own  funds  laid  down  In  the  Councl I  Directive 
on  the  Own  Funds  of  Credit  Institutions  (89/299/EEC)  or  the  alternative 
definition  set  out  In  this  Annex,  to  Investment  firms  which  are  not 
credit  Institutions.  Firms  using  the  latter  are  allowed  to  Include  a - 12  -
larger  amount  of  subordinated  debt  In  their  own  funds  than  under  the 
former  definition,  but,  unlike  credit  Institutions,  are  strictly 
required  to  deduct  their  I II  lquld  assets.  Credit  Institutions  are 
required  to apply  the definition  In  Councl I  Directive 89/299/EEC,  except 
In  the  case of  those  which  are  required  to meet  the  capital  requirements 
In  Annexes  2  and  3.  In  this  latter  case  the  competent  authorities  may 
permit  an  alternative definition which  Is  simi Jar,  though  not  Identical, 
to  the alternative definition  for  non-banks. - 13  -
Proposal  for  a 
COUNCIL  DIRECTIVE 
on  capital  adequacy  of 
Investment  firms  and  credtt  Institutions 
THE  COUNCIL  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty establ lshlng  the  European  Economic  Community, 
and  In  particular  the first  and  third sentences of Article 57(2)  thereof, 
Having  regard  to  the  proposal  from  the  Commlsslon<1>, 
In  cooperation with  the  European  Pari lamentC2), 
Having  regard  to  the opinion of  the  Economic  and  Social  Commlttee<3>, 
Whereas  Councl I  Directive  of  ...  on  Investment  services  In  the 
securities  fleld(4)  has  as  Its  main  objective  that  of  allowing 
Investment  firms  authorized  by  the  competent  authorities  of  their  home 
Member  States  and  supervised  by  those  same  authorities  to  establIsh 
branches  and  provide  services  freely  In  other  Member  Sta~es;  whereas  It 
accordingly  provides  for  coordination  of  the  rules  relating  to  the 
authorization  and  pursuit of  business of  Investment  firms; 
(1)  OJ  No 
(2)  OJ  No 
(3)  OJ  No 
(4)  OJ  No - 14  -
Whereas  Directive  ....  does  not,  however,  establIsh  common  standards  for 
the  own  funds  of  Investment  fIrms,  nor  Indeed  does  It  estab I Ish  the 
amounts  of  Initial  capital  of  such  firms;  whereas  It  does  not  establIsh  a 
common  framework  for  the  monitoring  of  market  risks  Incurred  by  the  same 
fIrms;  whereas  DIrectIve  makes  reference,  In  sever  a I  of  Its 
provisions,  to  another  Community  Initiative,  the objective of  which  would 
be  precisely  to  adopt  coordinated measures  In  those  fields; 
Whereas  the  approach  that  has  been  adopted  Is  to  achieve  only  the 
essential  harmonization  necessary  and  sufficient  to  secure  the  mutual 
recognition  of  authorization  and  of  prudential  supervision  systems; 
whereas  the  adoption  of  coordination  measures  as  regards  the  definition 
of  own  funds  of  Investment  fIrms,  the  estab I I  shment  of  the  amounts  of 
Initial  capital  and  the  establishment  of  a  common  framework  for  the 
monitoring  of  market  risks  of  Investment  firms  are  essential  aspects  of 
the  harmonization  necessary  for  the  achievement  of  mutual  recognition  and 
thus  the  completion of  the  Internal  financial  market; 
Whereas  the  Member  States  may  a I  so  estab I Ish  ru I  es  strIcter  than  those 
provided  for  In  the  present  Directive; 
Whereas  this  Directive  forms  part  of  the  wider  International  effort  to 
bring  about  approximation  of  the  rules  In  force  In  major  countries 
regarding  the  on-going  supervision of  Investment  firms; 
Whereas  common  basic  standards  for  the  own  funds  of  Investment  firms  are 
a  key  feature  In  the  creation  of  an  I nterna I  market  In  the  Investment 
services  sector  since  own  funds  serve  to  ensure  the  continuity  of 
Investment  fIrms  and  to  protect  Investors;  whereas  such  harmonIzatIon 
wl  11  strengthen  the  supervision  of  Investment  firms;  whereas  such 
standards must  apply  to alI  Investment  firms  In  the  Community; - 15  -
Whereas  In  a  common  financial  market  Investment  firms,  whether  they  are 
credit  Institutions  or  not,  engage  In  direct  competition  with  one 
another; 
Whereas  the  criteria  for  determining  the  composition  of  own  funds  must 
not  be  left  to  the  sole discretion of  Member  States; 
Whereas  the  adopt ion  of  common  basic  standards  on  the  own  funds  of 
Investment  firms  will  be  In  the  best  Interests  of  the  Community  In  that 
It  wl  I I  prevent  distortions  of  competition  and  wl  I I  strengthen  ,the 
Community  financial  system; 
Whereas  Investment  fIrms  whIch  are  credIt  I nst I tut Ions  a I ready  have  the 
definition 
1of  own  funds  provided  for  In  the  Councl I  Directive  89/299/EEC 
of  17  Apr I I  1989  on  the own  funds  of  credit  Institutions  (1); 
Whereas,  there  are  reasons  why  the  definition of  own  funds  of  Investment 
firms  may  be  adapted  from  that  In  Directive  89/299/EEC  In  order  to  take 
account  of  the  particular  characteristics  of  the  activities  of  those 
firms; 
Whereas,  however,  the  basis  for  a  definition of  own  funds  for  Investment 
firms,  which  are  not  credit  Institutions,  should  be  the  definition of own 
funds  of  credit  Institutions; 
Whereas  It  Is  necessary  to  establish  at  Community  level  the  amounts  of 
minimum  Initial  financial  resources  that  competent  authorities  must 
require  from  Investment  firms  In  order  to grant  them  authorisation; 
Whereas  these  amounts  should  be  fixed  at  a  level  which  should  ensure  that 
firms  engaging  In  Investment  services  have  the  capacity  to  fulfl I  their 
obligations  without,  at  the  same  time,  representing  an  Inappropriate 
barrier  to entry  In  the  market  by  new  firms; 
(1)  OJ  No  124,  5.5.1989,  p.  16. - 16  -
Whereas  It  Is  appropriate  to  give  Member  States  the  posslbl I lty  of 
reducing  these  amounts  In  cases where  Investment  firms  are  not  authorized 
to hold  customers'  monies  or  securities,  nor  to  act  as  market  makers,  nor 
to underwrite,  nor  to  take  positions of  their  own; 
Whereas  existing  Investment  firms  should  be  permitted  to  continue  their 
business  even  If  they  do  not  comply  with  the  minimum  amount  fixed  for  new 
firms; 
Whereas,  as  regards  Investment  firms  which  are  credit  Institutions,  the 
amount  of  minimum  Initial  capital  Is  already  established  In  the  Second 
Council  Direct lve  89/646/EEC  of  15  December  1989  coordlnat lon  of  laws, 
regulations  and  administrative  provisions  relating  to  taking  up  and 
pursuit  of  the  business  of  credit  Institutions  and  amending  Directive 
77/780/EEC)(1); 
Whereas  It  Is  necessary  to  provide  a  common  framework  for  the  supervision 
and  monitoring of  market  risks of  Investment  firms; 
Whereas  such  a  framework  must  cover  the  main  risks  Incurred  by  Investment 
firms  and,  In  particular,  position  risks,  counterparty/settlement  risks, 
Interest  rate risks and  foreign  exchange  risks; 
Whereas  the  best  approach  to ensure  the  financial  soundness of  Investment 
firms  Is  to  Impose  on  them  the  obligation  to  provide  at  all  times  a 
certain  amount  of  own  funds  to  cover  each  of  the  risks  associated  with 
their  particular activities; 
(1)  OJ  No  386,  30.12.1989,  p.  1. - 17-
Whereas,  for  credit  Institutions,  one  main  part  of  the  risk  associated 
with  their  business  Is  already  covered  by  the  Councl I  Directive 
89/647/EEC  of  18  Decmeber  1989  on  a  solvency  ratio  for  credit 
lnstltutlons<2>; 
Whereas,  for  that  reason,  It  Is  appropriate  to  give  the  competent 
authorities  the  posslbl I lty  to  choose  between  either  applying 
Directive 89/647/EEC  to  the  whole  book  of  credit  Institutions or  applying 
the  framework  provided  for  In  this Directive  to  their  trading  book; 
Whereas,  In  any  case,  credit  Institutions must  comply  with  the  provisions 
of  this Directive as  regards  the  coverage of  their  foreign  exchange  risk; 
Whereas  the  existence,  In  all  credit  Institutions,  of  Internal  systems 
for  monitoring  and  control I lng  the  market  risks  on  alI  their  business  Is 
a  particularly  Important  way  of  minimizing  such  risks;  whereas, 
consequently,  It  Is  necessary  that  such  systems  be  approved  by  the 
competent  authorities; 
Whereas  technical  modifications  to  the  detal led  rules  laid  down  In  this 
Directive  may  from  time  to  time  be  necessary  to  take  account  of  new 
developments  In  ,the  Investment  services  sector;  whereas  the  Commission 
shall  accordingly  make  such  modifications  as  are  necessary  within  the 
limits  of  the  Implement lng  powers  conferred  on  the  Commission  by  the 
Treaty; 
HAS  ADOPTED  THIS  DIRECTIVE: 
(2)  OJ  No  386,  30.12.1989,  p.  14. - 18  -
SCOPE 
Article  1 
1 . 
2 . 
t.4ember  States  sha I I  apply  the  reQuirements  of  this 
Directive 
the  3rd 
to  Investment  firms 
Indent  of  Article  1 
defined  In  accordance  with 
of  Directive  ...  / ...  /EEC, 
(]elating  to  Investment  servlceij  and  to  credit 
Institutions  as  defined  In  Article  2. 
A  t.4ember  State  may  Impose  addItIon  a I  or  more  stringent 
reQuirements  on  the  Investment  firms  and  credit 
Institutions  that  It  has  authorised. - 19  -
DEFINITIONS 
Article  2 
For  the  purposes  of  this  Directive: 
"credit  Institutions"  means  all  Institutions  meeting  the 
definition  In  the  1st  Indent  of  Article  1  of  the  Council 
Directive  77/780/EEc(1)  which  are  subject  to  the 
requirements  arising  from  Councl I  Directive  89/647/EEc(2); 
the  "trading  boolc"  of  a  credit  Institution  shall  Include 
Its  proprietary  positions  In  transferable  securities  or 
derivative  Instruments,  which  are  talcen  on  by  the  credit 
Institution  In  order  to  benefit  from  actual  or  expected 
differences  between  their  buying  and  selling  prices,  or  In 
order  to  hedge  other  elements  of  the  trading  boolc; 
"exchange-traded  Instruments"  means  Instruments  which  are 
traded  on,  or  under  the  rules  of,  a  stoclc  exchange,  or 
financial  futures  or  opt Ions  exchange  estab I I shed  and 
officially  recognized  In  the  relevant  Member  State,  or 
established  In  a  third  country  and  recognized  by  the 
competent  authorities  of  the  relevant  Member  State. 
Instruments  which  are  traded  on  such  exchanges  and  marlcets 
shal I  be  classified  as  equities,  debt  Instruments,  futures, 
options,  convertibles  and  warrants,  In  this  Directive; 
"over-the-counter 
Instruments; 
(OTC)  Instruments" 
(1)  OJ  No  L  322,  17.12.1977,  p.  30. 
(2)  OJ  No  L  386,  30.12.1989,  p.  14. 
means  a I  I  other - 20  -
"qualifying  Issuer"  means  a  credit  Institution,  or  a  firm 
whose  securities  are  I lsted  on  a  stock  exchange  In  a  Member 
State,  or  In  a  stock  exchange  In  a  third  country  when  this 
exchange  Is  recognized  by  the  competent  authorities  of  the 
relevant  Member  State; 
"central  government"  refers  to  the  ·central  government  or 
central  bank  of  Member  States  and  all  other  countr les  which 
are  members  of  the  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation 
and  Development  (OECD)  and  any  country  which  has  concluded 
special  lending  arrangements  with  the  International 
Monetary  Fund  (IMF).  associated  with  the  IMF  General 
Arrangements  to  Borrow  (GAB); 
"other  pub II  c  sector"  means  reg lona I  governments  and  loca I 
authorities  In  countries  which  are  members  of  the  OECD  or 
which  have  concluded  special  arrangements  with  the  IMF 
associated  with  the  IMF's  GAB; 
"convertible"  means  a  security,  which,  at  the  option  of  the 
hoI der,  can  be  exchanged  for  a not her  securIty,  usua I I y  the 
equity  of  the  Issuer; 
"warrant"  means  a  security  which  gives  the  holder  the  right 
to  purchase  a  number  of  shares  of  common  stoc~. 
at  a  stipulated  price  up  until  the  warrant's 
date; 
or  bonds, 
expiration 
"repurchase  agreement"  means  an  agreement  In  which  a  firm 
sells  securities  subject  to  a  commitment  to  repurchase  them 
(or  substituted  securities  of  the  same  description)  at  a 
specified  future  time  and  price,  according  to  the 
provisions  of  Article  12(2)  of  the  Councl I  Directive 
86/635/EEc(1); 
(1)  OJ  No  L  372,  31.12.1986,  p.  1. - 21  -
"reverse  repurchase  agreement"  means  an  agreement  In  which 
a  fIrm  buys  secur It  les  from  a  counterparty  and  agrees  to 
sell  them  (or  substituted  securities  of  the  same 
description)  back  to  that  counterparty  at  a  specified 
future  time  and  price,  according  to  the  provisions  of 
Article  12(2)  of  Directive  86/635/EEC; 
"clearing  member"  means  a  member  of  both  the  exchange  and 
a  direct  contractual  the  clearing  house,  thus  having 
relationship  with  the  central 
guarantor).  Non-clearing  members 
routed  through  a  clearing  member; 
counter party 
must  have  their 
(market 
trades 
"local  firm"  means  a  firm  dealing  only  for  Its  own  account 
on  a  financial  futures  or  options  exchange  or  for  the 
accounts  of,  or  making  a  price  to,  other  members  of  the 
same  exchange,  which  Is  guaranteed  by  a  clearing  member  of 
the  same  exchange,  with  this  guarantee  being  taken  Into 
account  In  the  setting  of  the  guarantor's  capital 
requirements; 
"delta"  means  the  expected  change  In  an  option  price  as  a 
proportion  of  a  small  change  In  the  price  of  the  Instrument 
underlying  the  option; 
for  the  purposes  of  Point  5  of  Annex  1,  "long  position" 
means  a  position  In  which  a  firm  has  fixed  the  Interest 
rate  It will  receive  at  some  time  In  the  future,  and  "short 
position"  means  a  position  In  which  It  has  fixed  the 
Interest  rate  It will  pay  at  some  time  In  the  future; - 22  -
"own  funds"  means  own  funds  as  defined  In  Directive 
89/299/EEC.  However  this  definition  may  be  modified,  for 
credit  Institutions,  In  the  circumstances  described  In 
Point  2  of  Annex  6.  In  the  case  of  Investment  firms  which 
are  not  credit  Institutions,  the  competent  authorities  may 
use  the  definition  set  out  In  Point  4  of  Annex  6  Instead; 
"Initial  capital"  means  capital  as  defined  In  Points  (1) 
and  (2)  of  Article  2(1)  of  Directive  89/299/EEC.  The  paid-
up  share  capital  component  of  this  shall  comprise  all 
amounts  regardless  of  their  actual  designations,  which,  In 
accordance  with  the  legal  structure  of  the  Institution 
concerned,  are  regarded  under  national  law  as  equity 
capital  subscribed  and  paid  by  the  shareholders  or  other 
proprietors. 
INITIAL  CAPITAL  AND  DEROGATIONS  FROM  CAPITAL  REQUIREMENTS 
Article  3 
1.  References  to  Investment  firms  In  Articles  3  to  6  denote 
only  those  Investment  firms  which  are  neither  credit 
Institutions,  nor  local  firms,  nor  firms  engaged  purely  In 
the  business  of  supplying  Investment  advice. 
2.  Investment  firms  shall  have  Initial  capital  of  at  least 
ECU  500  000. 
3.  t.4ember  States  may  reduce  thIs  amount  to  ECU  50  000  where  a 
firm  Is  neither  authorised  to  hold  customers'  monies  or 
securities,  nor  to  act  as  a  market  maker,  nor  to  underwrite 
except  where  the  firm  Is  Involved  only  In  the  distribution 
of  Issues  on  a  best  efforts  basis. - 23  -
4.  Member  .States  may  reduce  the  amount  In  paragraph  2  to 
.ECU  100  000  In  the  case  of  firms  who  hold  clients'  monies 
or  securities  In  acting  as  agents  or  portfolio  managers, 
but  who  do  not  hold  trading  positions  of  their  own. 
5.  Notwithstanding  paragraphs  2,  3  and  4,  Member  States  may 
continue  the  authorisation  of  Investment  firms  In  existence 
before  this  Directive  Is  Implemented,  whose  own  funds  are 
less  than  the  Initial  capital  levels  specified  In  those 
paragraphs.  The  own  funds  of  such  fIrms  sha II  not  fa I I 
below  the  highest  level  recorded  after  the  date  of 
notification of  this  Directive. 
6.  If control  of  an  Investment  firm  falling  within  paragraph  5 
Is  tak:en,  other  than  through  Inheritance,  by  a  natural  or 
legal  person  other  than  the  person  who  controlled  It 
previously,  the  own  funds  of  that  Institution  must  attain 
at  least  the  appropriate  level  prescribed  for  Initial 
capital  In  paragraphs  2,  3  and  4. 
1.  However,  In  certain  specific  circumstances  and  with  the 
8 . 
consent  of  the  competent  authorities,  where  there  is  a 
merger  of  two  or  more  Investment  fIrms,  the  own  funds  of 
the  firm  resulting  from  the  merger  need  not  attain  the 
level  of  Initial  capital  referred  to  In  paragraphs  2,  3  and 
4.  However  the  own  funds  of  the  new  Investment  fIrm  may 
not  fall  below  the  total  own  funds  of  the  merged  f  lrms  at 
the  time  of  the  merger,  as  long  as  the  appropriate  levels 
.pursuant  to  paragraphs  2,  3  and  4  have  not  been  attained. 
' 
An  Investment  firm's  own 
amount  of  Initial  capital 
funds  may  not  fall  below  the 
required  under  paragraphs  2,  3 
and  4  or  the  amounts  of  own  funds  required  under  paragraphs 
5,  6  and  7.  However,  If,  In  the  cases  referr~d  to  In 
paragraphs  2,3,4i5  and  7  the  own  funds  should  be  reduced, 
the  competent  aut~orltles  may,  where  the  circumstances 
justify  It,  allow  an  Investment  firm  a  limited  period  In 
which  to  rectify  Its situation  or  cease  Its activities. - 24  -
PROVISION  AGAINST  RISKS 
Article  4 
1 .  Investment  firms  shall  provide  at  al  times  a  certain 
amount  of  own  funds  to  cover  each  of  the  various  risks 
associated  with  their  particular  activities.  The  sum  of 
these  amounts,  which  shal I  be  calculated  In  accordance 
with  th.e  methods  outlined  In  paragraph  5  below  and 
Annexes  1  to  5,  shal J  be  their  overall  own  funds 
requirement.  They  shall  ensure  that  their  overal  own 
funds  requIrement  Is  I ower  than  or  equa I  to  the  own 
funds  that  they  hold. 
2.  Credit  Institutions  shall  provide,  In  addition  to  the 
requirements  set  in  Directive  89/647/EEC  and  any  set  In 
paragraphs  4  and  5  below,  own  funds  to  cover  their 
foreign  exchange  risk;  this  amount  shall  be  calculated 
I n  a c cor dan  c· e  w  I t h  t he  me t hod  out I  I ned  I n  Anne x  4 . 
Pend I n g  fur t her  harmon I sat I on  however ,  M_e m  be r  States 
may  waive  the  application  of  this  requirement  In 
relation  to  credit  Institutions  whose  business  Is 
limited  as  follows:  their  overall  net  foreign  exchange 
position,  calculated  In  accordance  with  Annex  4,  must 
not  exceed  the  equivalent  of  10%  of  own  funds. 
3.  The  competent  authorities  shall  require  credit 
Institutions  to  set  up  systems,  which  need  to·  be 
approved  by  the  competent  authorities,  to  monitor  and 
control  the  Interest  rate,  equity  price  and 
counterparty/settlement  risks  on  all  of  their  business. - 25  -
4.  The  competent  authorities  shall.  require  credit 
5. 
Institutions  either  on  a  general,  or  on  an 
Individual  basis  to  meet  the  capital  requirements 
set  out  In  Directive  89/647/EEC  on  alI  of  their 
business,  or  may,  Instead  of  this,  require  them  to  meet 
the  capital  requirements  laid  down  In  Annexes  2  and  3 
hereto  on  their  trading  books,  and  the  requirements  of 
Directive  89/647/EEC  on  the  rest  of  their  business. 
The  competent 
require  that 
authorities  In  Member  States 
Investment  fIrms  have  adequate  own 
sha 11 
funds 
to  cover  the  risks  arising  In  connection  with  business 
that  Is  outside  the  activities  listed  In  Council 
Directive  ..  / ...  /EEC  j!elatlng  to  Investment  servlces].-
ln  addition  they  shall  ensure  that  the  own  funds  of 
I n vestment  · f  I r m  s ,  and  t hose  c red I t  I n s t  I t u t  I on s  t hat 
are  required  to  meet  the  capital  requirements  In 
Annexes  2  and  3  hereto,  protect  them  against  the  risks 
In  those  Instruments  that  fal I  within  the  activities of 
Council  Directive  ..  / ...  /EEC  ~!elating  to  Investment 
service~  but  which  are  not  explicitly  catered  for  In 
this  Directive,  and,  In  the  case  of  such  credit 
Institutions,  are  within  the  trading  book.  All  cases 
covered  by  this  paragraph  shall  be  reported  to  the 
Commission  by  the  relevant  competent  authorities. 
EVALUATION  OF  POSITIONS  FOR  REPORTING  PURPOSES 
Article  5 
1.  Positions  shall  be  marked  to  market  dally  by  Investment 
firms  and  credit  Institutions unles•  Annexes  2,  3  and  5 
hereto  do  not  apply  to  them. - 26  -
2.  In  the  absence  of  readily  available  market  prices 
e.g.  In  the  case  of  dealing  In  new  Issues  on  the 
primary  markets,  the  authorities  may  waive  the 
requIrement  under  paragraph  1,  and  requIre  fIrms  to 
use  a I t e r n a t  I v e  me t hod  s  o f  eva I u a t  I on·  p r o v I d e d  t h a t 
these  methods  are  sufficiently  prudent,  and  have  been 
approved  by  the  competent  authorities. 
REPORTING  REQUIREMENTS 
Article  6 
1.  Member  States  shall  require  that  Investment  firms  and 
credit  Institutions  provide  the  competent  authorities 
of  the  home  Member  State  with  all  the  Information 
necessary  to  assess  their  compliance  with  the  rules 
adopted  In  accordance  with  this  Directive.  Member 
States  sha I I  a I so  ensure  that  Investment  fIrms·  and 
credit  Institutions'  Internal  control  mechanisms  and 
administrative  and  accounting  procedures  permit  the 
verification  of  their  compliance  with  such  rules  at  all 
times. - 27  -
2.  Investment  firms  which  are  not  credit  Institutions 
shall  be  obliged  to  report  to  the  competent 
authorities  In  the  manner  specified  by  the  latter  at 
least  once  every  month  In  the  case  of  firms  which  are 
authorised  to  deal  as  principal,  at  least  once  every 
three  months  In  the  case  of  those  firms  described  In 
Article  3(4),  and  at  least  once  a  year  In  the  case  of 
those  firms  covered  by  Article  3(3).  Such  reports  must 
be  received  by  the  competent  authorities  within  two 
weeks  of  the  end  of  the  reporting  period. 
3.  Credit  Institutions  shall  be  obliged  to  report  In  the 
manner  specified  by  the  competent  authorities  at  the 
same  time  as  they  are  obliged  to  report  under  Directive 
89/647/EEC,  and  at  more  frequent  Intervals  If  the 
competent  authorities  so  request. 
COMPETENT  AUTHORITIES 
Article  7 
1.  Member  States  shal I  designate  the  authorities  which  are 
to  carry  out  the  duties  pr~vlded  for  In  this  Directive. 
They  shall  Inform  the  Commission  thereof,  Indicating 
any  division of  duties. 
! 
2.  The  authorities  referred  to  In  paragraph  1  must  be 
public  authorities  or  bodies  officially  recognized  by 
national  law  or  by  public  authorities  to  be  part  of  the 
supervisory  system  prevailing  In  the  relevant  Member 
State. 
3.  The  authorities  concerned  must  be  granted  alI  the 
powers  necessary  to  carry  out  their  tasks. - 28  -
4.  The  competent  author It les  of  dIfferent  t.4ember  States 
shall  collaborate  closely  to  carry  out  the  dut les 
provided  for  In  this  Directive,  particularly  when 
Investment  services  are  provided  on  a  services  basis  or 
by  the  establishment  of  branches  In  one  or  more  t.4ember 
States.  They  shall  supply  one  another  on  request  with 
all  Information  likely  to  facilitate  the  supervision  of 
the  capIta I  adequacy  of  Investment  fIrms  and  credIt 
Institutions  and  particularly  the  verification  of  their 
compliance  to  the  rules  laid  down  In  this  Directive. 
Any  exchange  of  Information  between  competent 
authorities  which  Is  provided  for  In  this  Directive  In 
respect  of  Investment  firms  shall  be  subject  to  the 
obligation  of  professional  secrecy  as  set  out  In 
Article  20  of  Directive  ...  / ...  /EEC  jielatlng  to 
Investment  service!]  and,  In  respect  of  credl.t 
Institutions,  subject  to  the  obligation  set  out  In 
Art lcle  12  of  Council  Direct lve  77/780/EEC. 
COMMITTEE 
Article  8 
1 •  T"h e  t e c h n I c a I  am e n d me n t s  t o  be  made  t o  t h I s  D I r e c t  I v e 
In  the  following  areas  shall  be  adopted  In  accordance 
with  the  procedure  laid  down  In  paragraph  2: 
-definitions  In  Article  2; 
- Initial  capital  requirements  In 
-Article 3; 
-ceiling  referred  to  In  Article  4(2); 
-treatment  of  Instruments  within  the  scope  of 
Directive  .•  / ..•  /EEC  relating  to  Investment 
services  ,  but  not  covered  In  this  Directive; 
-calculation of  net  open  positions  In  Annex  1; 
-Annex  2; - 29  -
- counterparty/settlement  risk  weights  In  Annex  3; 
-foreign  exchange  risk  weights  In  Annex  4; 
-time period  used  In  Annex  5; 
definition  of  own  funds  In  Points  2,  4  and  5  of 
Annex  6. 
2.  Whenever  the  technical  amendments  referred  to  In  the 
first  paragraph  are  to  be  made  to  this  Directive, 
Article  23(2),  of  Council  Directive  ..  / ...  /EEC 
[!elating  to  Investment  servlceSJ  shall  apply. 
FINAL  PROVISIONS 
Article  9 
1 .  Member  States  sha I I  bring  Into  force  the  laws, 
regulations  and  administrative  provisions  necessary  to 
comply  with  this  Directive  by  1  January  1993  at  the 
latest.  They  shall  forthwith  Inform  the  Commission 
thereof. 
The  provisions  adopted  pursuant  to  the  first  paragraph 
sha I I  make  express  reference  to  thIs  DIrectIve. 
2.  Member  States  shall  communicate  to  the  Commission  the 
texts  of  the  main  laws,  regulations  and  administrative 
provisions  which  they  adopt  In  the  field  covered  by 
this  Directive. 
Article  10 
This  Directive  Is  addressed  to  the  Member  States. 
Done  at  Brussels,  For  the  Council 
The  President - 30  -
ANNEX  1 
CALCULATION  OF  NET  OPEN  POSITIONS 
Equity  and  debt  Instruments 
1.  The  firm's  long  and  short  positions  In  the  same  equity, 
debt  and  convertible  Issues  shall  be  netted.  In 
calculating  the  net  position  the  competent  authorities 
may  allow  positions  In  derivative  Instruments  to  be 
treated  as  the  underlying  Cor  notional) 
security/securities.  The  competent  authorities  shall 
allow  the  netting  of  Identical  financial  futures, 
options  and  warrants,  contracts. 
2.  Debt  Instruments  denominated  In  the  same  currency  shall 
be  grouped  by  maturity  (according  to  Annex  2)  In 
reflection  of  the  residual  maturity  of  fixed  rate 
Instruments,  and  the  period  to  repricing  of  other 
Instruments. 
3.  Debt  Instruments  shall  be  categorised  by  Issuer  as 
follows:  central  government,  other  public  sector, 
qualifying  and  other. 
Convertibles 
4.  No  nett I ng  Is  a I I owed 
offsetting  positions  In 
between  convertibles  and 
the  underlying  Instrument 
Itself,  unless  the  competent  authorities  adopt  an 
approach  under  which  the  likelihood  of  a  particular 
convertible  being  converted  Is  taken  lnt9  account,  or 
have  a  capIta I  requIrement  to  cover  any  potent I a I  I oss 
which  could  be  Incurred  on  conversion. - 31  -
Other  Instruments 
5.  Interest  rate  futures  and  forward  rate  agreements 
(FRAs)  whlc~  are  not  based  on  an  underlying  Instrument, 
will  be  treated  as  combinations  of  long  and  short 
positions.  Thus  a  long  futures  position  wl I I  be  treated 
as  a  combination  of  a  borrowing  maturing  on  the 
delivery  date  of  the  futures  contract  and  a  holding  of 
an  asset  maturing  on  the  expiration  date  of  the  future. 
The  opposite  holds  for  a  short  position.  Both  the 
borrowing  and  asset  holding  will  be  Included  In  the 
central  government  column  of  Table  1  In  Annex  2.  A 
future  or  a  forward  whIch  Is  based  on  an  under I y I ng 
debt  Instrument  will  be  treated  as  either  a  long  or 
short  position  In  the  underlying  Instrument.  Its 
maturity  will  be  taken  to  be  the  period  until  delivery 
or  exercise  of  the 
underlying  security, 
contract,  plus  the  life  of  the 
or,  If  the  life  of  the  underlying 
security  exceeds  a  year,  as  this  life  ltsel.f.  The 
competent  authorities .may  allow  the  requirement  for  an 
exchange-traded  future  to  be  equal  to  the  margin  held 
at  the  exchange  If  they  are  fully  satisfied  that  It 
provides  an  accurate  measure  of  the  risk  associated 
with  the  future. 
6.  Options  on  Interest  rates,  debt  Instruments,  equities, 
financial  futures,  swaps  and  foreign  currencies,  are 
treated  as  If  they  were  positions  In  the  delta 
m  u I t  I p I I e d  by  t he  am o u n t  o f  .t h e  u n de r  I y I n g  l n s t r u me n t 
to  which  the  option  refers.  The  delta  used  should  be 
that  of  the  exchange  concerned,  or,  where  thIs  Is  not 
available  or  for  OTC  options,  that  calculated  by  the 
firm  Itself,  subJect  to  the  competent  authorities  being 
satisfied  that  the  model  used  by  the  firm  Is 
reasonable.  The  competent  authorities  shal I  require 
that  the  other  risks,  apart  from  the  delta  risk, 
associated  with  options  are  safeguarded  against.  The 
competent  author It les may  a I low  the requIrement  agaInst - 32  -
a  wrItten,  exchange-traded  opt I on  to  be  equa I  to  the 
margin  held  at  the  exchange  If  they  are  fully satisfied 
that  It  provides  an  accurate  measure  of  the  risk 
associated  with  the  option,  and  for  the  requirement  on 
a  bought,  exchange-traded  or  OTC  option  to  be  the  same 
as  for  the  Instruments  underlying  It,  subject  to  the 
constraint  that  the  resulting  requirement  does  not 
exceed  the  market  value  of  the  option.  The  requirement 
against  a  written  OTC  option  will  be  set  In  relation  to 
the  Instrument  underlying  lt. 
7.  Swaps  will  be  treated  for  Interest  rate  r lsk  purposes 
on  the  same  basis  as  on-balance  sheet  lnstrumen1s.  Thus 
an  Interest  rate  swap  under  which  a  firm  receives 
floating  rate  Interest  and  pays  fixed  rate  Interest 
will  be  treated  as  equivalent  to  a  long  position  In  a 
floating  rate  Instrument  of  maturity  equivalent  to  the 
period  until  the  next  Interest  fixing,  and  a  short 
position  In  a  fixed  rate  Instrument  with  the  same 
maturity  as  the  swap  Itself.  Competent  authorities  may 
however  set  alternative  requirements  to  these  for  firms 
using  swap  models  which  provide,  to  the  satisfaction of 
the  competent  authorities,  a  more  accurate  measure  of 
the  risks  In  swaps. 
8.  Warrants  shal I  be  treated  In  the  same  way  that  options 
are  treated  In  paragraph  6. 
Currency  conversion 
9.  All  net  positions,  Irrespective  of  their  sign,  must  be 
converted  on  a  dally  basis  Into  the  firm's  reporting 
currency  at  the  prevailing  spot  exchange  rate  before 
their  aggregation. - 33  -
ANNEX  2 
Position  risk 
1.  Investment  firms  shal I  calculate  their  net  positions  as 
defined  In  Annex  1. 
2.  Investment  firms  wl  I I  apply  the  weights  shown  In  Table 
1  to  their  net.  fixed  Interest  rate  positions.  whether 
In  their  own  or  foreign  currencies.  as  calculated  In 
Annex  1 •  and  thus  calculate  their  weighted  long 
positions  and  their  weighted  short  positions. 
Table  1 
Residual  Central  Other public sector  Other 
maturity  government  and  qual tfytng 
and  European 
Ccmnuntty 
"  "  "  up  to  3 months  0.3  0.5  8.0 
more  than  3  up  to.  6 months  0.5  1.0  8.0 
more  than  6  up  to 12 ·months  1.0  1.6  8.0 
more  than  1  up  to  2  years  1.6  3.6  8.0 
more  then  2  up  to  5  years  2.9  4.9  10.0 
more  then  5  up  to  10  years  3.8  5.8  15.0 
more  then  10  up  to 20  years  4.8  6.8  15.0 
Over  20  years  5.8  7.8  15.0 
3.  The  capital  reQuirement  will  be 
plus 
less 
the  sum  of  the  weighted  long  positions 
the  sum  of  the  weighted  short  pos.ltlons 
any  hedging  allowances.  calculated  as  follows: 
150%  of  any  weighted  long  (or  short)  position  In 
central  government  bonds  which  can  be  offset  In 
part  or  fully  against  a  weighted  short  (or  long) 
position  In  central  government  bonds  In  the  same  or 
an  adjacent  maturity  band; Duration 
- 34  -
100%  of  any  weighted  long  (or  short)  position  In 
centra I  government  bonds  whIch  can  be  offset  In 
part  or  fully  against  a  weighted  short  (or  long) 
position  In  central  government  bonds  In  the  next-
but-one  maturity  band.; 
In  the  case  of  hedges  between  positions  In  the 
'other  public  sector  and  Qualifying'  bonds  (the 
second  category  In  Table  1).  the  respective 
percentages  are  120%  and  80%,  rather  than  the  150% 
and  100%  used  for  central  government  bonds. 
In  the  case  of  a  hedge  between  a  position  fn 
central  government  bonds  and  a  position  In  'other 
public  sector  and  Qualifying'  bonds,  the  respective 
percentages  are  also  120%  and  80%. 
(Note  that  the  unused  portion  of  partially  offset 
weighted  positions  can  be  employed  In  this 
process.) 
4.  Competent  authorities  In  a  Member  State  may  use  a 
system  for  applying  capital  reQUirements  to  the 
Interest  rate  dependent  business  of  Investment  firms, 
which  reflects  duration.  Instead  of  the  rules  set  out 
In  paragraphs  2  to  3  above.  so  long  as  the  reQuirements 
emana·tlng  from  It  are  broadly  eQuivalent  to  those 
resulting  from  the  application  of  the  rules  In 
paragraphs  2  to  3. 
EQuities 
5.  The  capital  reQuired  against  a  long  or  a  short  eQuity 
position  shall  be  10%  of  Its  value  In  the  case  of  a 
Qualifying  eQuity  and  25%  for  any  other  eQuity. - 35  -
6.  The  competent  authorities  may  allow  a  reduction  In  the 
requ l·rement  for  any  reduct I on  In  r  I sic  due  to 
diversification,  whether  through  the  Investment  firm 
holding  a  large  number  of  long,  or  short,  positions  In 
equities  or  equities  derivatives,  or  from  Its  holding 
long  and  short  positions  In  different  equities  and 
equities  derivatives.  However  any  such  reduction  shall 
only  be  allowed  on  .the  basis  that  the  resulting  capital 
requirement  Is  sufficient  to  cover  the  firm  against  a 
10%  change  In  the  general  level  of  equity  prices  on  Its 
main  markets. 
Underwriting  of  debt  and  equity  Instruments 
7.  In  the  case  of  underwrItIng  of  Issues  of  debt  and 
equity  Instruments,  the  competent  authorities  may  allow 
the  weights  referred  to  In  paragraphs  2  and  5  above  to 
be  reduced  by  60%  during  the  first  week,  by  35%  during 
the  second  week,  and  by  20%  during  the  third  week 
following  the  day  on  which  the  underwriting  firm 
entered  Into  an  Irrevocable  commitment  to  purchase  the 
s e c u r  I t  I e s ,  p r o v I de  d  t h a t  t h e  s e c u r  I t  I e s  I n  que  s t. I on 
are  to  be  traded  on  a  regulated  market  recognised  by 
the  competent  authorities. 
Risk  concentration 
8.  An  Investment  firm  which· has,  or  Is  committed  to,  a 
long  or  short  position  In  a  particular  Issue  of 
securities  which  exceeds  25%  of  the.total  Issue,  shall 
meet  an  additional  capital  requirement  equivalent  to 
100%  of  the  requirement  against  the  unhedged  position 
set  out  In  paragraphs  2  and  5  above. - 36  -
9.  An  Investment  firm's  total  exposure  to  an  Issuer  cannot 
exceed  25%  of  Its  own  funds  without  the  Investment  firm 
notifying  the  competent  authorities:  the  firm  shall 
meet  an  additional  capital  requirement  against  such 
exposures,  calculated  by  summing  the  requirements 
against  each  unhedged  position  In  the  overall  exposure. - 37  -
ANNEX  3 
Counterparty/settlement  risk 
1.  In  the  case  of  transactions  In  which  bonds  and  equities 
(excluding  repurchase  and  reverse  repurchase 
agreements)  are  unsettled  after  their  due  delivery 
dates,  a  firm  must  calculate  the  price  difference  to 
which  It  Is  exposed.  This  Is  the  difference  between  the 
agreed  settlement  price  for  the  bond  or  equity  In 
quest lon,  and  Its  current  market  value,  where  the 
difference  could  Involve  a  loss  for  the  firm.  It  must 
multiply  this  difference  by  the  appropriate  factor  In 
Column  A  of  Table  1  In  order  to  calculate  Its  capital 
requirement. 
2.  Notwithstanding  paragraph  1,  a  firm  can,  at  the 
discretion  of  Its  competent  authorities,  calculate  Its 
capital  requirements  by  multiplying  the  agreed 
settlement  price  of  every  transaction  which  Is 
unsettled  between  5  and  45  days  after  Its  due  date,  by 
the  appropriate  factor  In  Column  B  of  Table  1.  From  45 
or  more  days  after  the  due  date  It  shall  take  the 
requirement  to  be  100%  of  the  price  difference  to  which 
It  Is  exposed,  as  In  Column  A. 
Table  1 
Number  of  days  after 
due  settlement  date 
5-15 
16-30 
31-45 
46  +more 
Column  A 
8% 
50% 
75% 
100% 
.  Co I umn  B 
0.25% 
0.5% 
2.0% 
see  para.  2 - 3~ -
Repurchase  and  reverse  repurchase  agreements 
3.  In  the  case  of  repurchase  agreements  the  firm  shal I  put 
up  the  difference  between  the  market  value  of  the 
securities,  and  the  amount  borrowed  by  the  firm  (which 
Is  their  original  sale  value)  where  this  difference  Is 
positive.  In  the  case  of  reverse  repurchase  agreements 
the  firm  shal I  put  up  the  difference  between  the  amount 
It  has  lent  plus  accrued  Interest,  and  the  market  value 
of  the  securities  It  has  received  (which  Is  their 
original  sale  value  plus  accrued  Interest)  where  this 
difference  Is  positive.  In  the  cas~ of  both  repurchase 
agreements  and  reverse  repurchase  agreements  the 
competent  authorities  may  reduce  the  requirement  to  the 
extent  that  the  borrower  provides  the  lender  with  the 
m  a r g I n  t h a t  I s  no r m  a I I y  r e Q u I r e d  I n  t h e  m  a r k e t  1. n 
question. 
OTC  derivative  Instruments 
4.  The  requirement  shall  be  calculated  as  follows:  first 
the  firm  wl  I I  sum  (I)  the  total  replacement  cost 
(obtained  by  marking  to  market)  of  al  Its  contracts, 
Including  bought  equity  option  contracts,  with 
positive  values  and  (II),  In  the  case  of  Interest  rate 
and  exchange  rate  contracts,  an  amount  for  potential 
future  credit  exposure,  calculated  by  multiplying  the 
total  notional  principal  amount  of  Its  contracts  by  the 
following  weights,  as  appropriate: 
Residual  maturity 
less  than  one  year 
one  year  and  over 
Interest  rate 
contracts 
0.5% 
Exchange  rate 
contracts 
1. 0% 
5.0% - 39  -
The  capital  requirement  will 
(II)  where  the  counterparty 
sector,  2%  of  the  sum  where 
be  4%  of  the  sum  of  (I)  and 
Is  In  the  non-bank  private 
It  Is  In  the. bank.lng  sector 
and/or  In  the  regional  government  or  local  authority  sector, 
and  zero  If  It  Is  the  central  government. - 40  -
ANNEX  4 
Foreign  exchange  risk 
1.  The  overall  net  foreign  exchange  position,  calculated 
In  accordance  with  the  prQcedures  set  out  below,  shal I 
be  assigned  an  8%  capital  requirement. 
2.  A  two-stage  calculation  shal I  be  used. 
3.  First,  the  firm's  net  open  currency  position  In  each 
currency  (Including  the  reporting  currency)  shall  be 
calculated.  This  position  shal I  consist  of  the  addition 
of  the  following  elements  (positive  or  negative): 
the  net  spot  position  (I.e.  all  asset  Items  less  all 
liability  Items,  Including  accrued  Interest,  In  the 
currency  In  quest I on); 
the  net  forward  position  (I.e.  all  amounts  to  be 
receIved  I ess  a I I  amounts  to  be  paId  under  forward 
exchange  transactions,  Including  currency  futures  and 
the  principal  on  currency  swaps  not  Included  In  the 
spot  position); 
guarantees  (and  similar  Instruments)  that  are  certain 
to  be  ca I I ed; 
net  future  Income/expenses  (at  the  dlscret lon  of  the 
reporting  Institution;  when  this  discretion  has  been 
used,  It  may  not  be  changed  without  the  prior  approval 
of  the  competent  authorities); 
the  net  delta  (or  delta-based)  equivalent  of  the  total 
book  of  foreign  currency  options. - 41  -
4.  Second,  net  short  and  long  positions  In  each  currency 
other  than  the  reporting  currency,  shall  be  conv,erted 
at  spot  rates  Into  the  report lng  currency.  They  shall 
then  be  summed  separately  to  form  respectively  the 
total  of  the  net  short  positions  and  the  total  of  the 
net  long  positions.  The  higher  of  these  two  totals  wl 11 
be  the  firm's  overal I  net  foreign  exchange  position. 
5.  Net  positions  In  composite  currencies  may  be  decomposed 
Into  the  component  currencies  according  to  the  quotas 
In  force. - 42  -
ANNEX  5 
Other  risks 
1.  Investment  firms,  excluding  credit  Institutions,  shall 
be  required  to  hold  own  funds  equivalent  to  one  quarter 
of  their  previous  year's  fixed  overheads.  The  competent 
authorities  may  adjust  this  requirement  In  the  event  of 
a  material  change  to  a  firm's  business  since  the 
previous  year.  When  the  firm  has  not  completed  a 
year's  business,  Including  on  the  day  It  starts  up,  the 
requirement  will  be  a  quarter  of  the  fixed  overheads 
figure  projected  In  Its  business  plan,  unless  an 
adjustment  to  this  ptan  Is  required  by  the  authorities. 
For  firms  that  are  starting  up,  own  funds  shall  be 
greater  than  or  equal  to  this  amount,  and  Initial 
capital  at  least  equal  to  the  requirements  laid  down  In 
Article  3. - 43  -
ANNEX  6 
own  funds 
1.  The  own  funds  of  credit  Institutions  shall  be  defined 
In  accordance  with  Councl I  Directive  89/299/EEC. 
2.  Notwithstanding  paragraph  1,  the  competent  authorities 
may  permit  those  credit  Institutions  which  are  obliged 
to  meet  the  capital  requirements  on  their  trading  book 
that  are  laid  down  In  Annexes  2  and  3,  to  use  an 
alternative  definition  of  own  funds  when  meeting  these 
requirements.  This  alternative  definition  shall 
Include  share  capital  and  reserves  as  defined  In  Points 
(1)  and  (2)  Article  2(1)  of  Council  Directive  89/299/EEC, 
and  subordinated  loan  capital  subject  to  the  following 
conditions.  First,  this  subordinated  loan  capital 
shal I  not  exceed  250%  of  the  share  capital  ~nd  reserves 
Included  In  this  definition.  Second,  the  use  of  this 
alternative  definition  shall  not  result  In  adding  more 
than  25%  to  the  total  amount  of  own  funds  which  would 
result  from  applying  Council  Directive  89/299/EEC  to 
the  credit  Institution  as  a  whole.  Third,  the 
conditions  laid  down  In  5(2)  below  must  apply  to  this 
subordinated  loan  capital. 
3.  The  own  funds  of  Investment  firms  which  are  not  credit 
Institutions  shall  be  defined  In  accordance  with 
Councl I  Directive  89/299/EEC. 
4 ( 1 )  No t w I t h s t and I· n g  t h e  r e q u I r em en t s  o f  p a r a g r a p h  3 ,  t h e 
com~etent  authorities  may  permit  Investment  firms  which 
are  not  credit  Institutions  an  alternative  definition 
of  own  funds.  This  shall  Include: 
(2)  share  capital  and  reserves  as  defined  In  1(1)  and  1(2) 
of  Article  2  of  Councl I  Directive  89/299/EEC; ~  44  -
(3)  minus  Intangible  assets  within  the  meaning  of  Article 
4(9)  ('assets')  of  Council  Directive  86/635/EEC; 
(4)  plus  net  profits  (or  minus  net  losses)  after  allowance 
for  all  anticipated  tax  liabilities; 
(5)  plus  subordinated  loan  capital  subject  to  the 
conditions  set  out  In  paragraph  5(2); 
(6)  minus  l"lllquld  assets. 
5(1)  Firms  shall  be  required  to  satisfy  their  auditors  and 
competent  author It les  that  they  have  adequate  systems 
to  calculate  with  reasonable  accuracy  at  any  time  the 
financial  position  of  the  firm. 
(2)  The  subordinated  loan  capital  referred  to  In  4(5)  shall 
have  an  Initial  maturity  of  at  least  two  years.  It 
shall  be  fully  paid-up  and  the  loan  agreement  shall  not 
.Include  any  clause  providing  that,  In  specified 
circumstances,  other  than  the  winding-up  of  the 
Investment  firm,  the  debt  will  become  repayable  before 
the  agreed  repayment  date,  unless  the  supervisory 
authorities  agree  to  It  having  been  given  two  days' 
no t  I c e •  Sub  o r d I n a t e d  de  b t  m  a y  no t  be  r e p a I d  I f  s u c h. 
repayment  would  mean  that  the  own  funds  of  the  firm  In 
question  would  then  stand  at  below  120%  of  the  firm's 
over  a I I  requIrement. 
(3)  The  subordinated  loan  capital  referred  to  In  4(5)  m•n 
not  exceed  a  maximum  of  250%  of  the  sum  total  of  Items 
4(2)  plus  4(4)  less  4(3)  and  should  only  approach  this 
maximum  In  particular  circumstances  acceptable  to  the 
relevant  competent  authorities. - 45  -
(4)  Illiquid assets  Include: 
fixed  assets 
buildings  are 
loans); 
(except  to  the  extent  that 
allowed  to  count  against 
I and  and 
secured 
Investment  In  connected  companies  If  these 
companies  are  subsidiaries  or  If  the  shares  are  not 
readily  realisable  Investments; 
deposits  made,  other  than  those  which  are  with  a 
credit  Institution,  local  authority  or  regional 
government  and  available  for  repayment  within 
ninety  days,  and  also  excluding  margin  payments  In 
connection  with  futures  or  written  options 
contracts; 
guarantees  given; 
deficiencies  In  subsidiaries; 
all  other  assets  (Including  physical  stocks)  unless 
they  are  subJect  to  the  capital  requirements  set 
out  In  this  Directive,  or  pursuant  to  Article  4(5). I. 
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COMPETITIVENESS  AND  EMPLOYMENT  IMPACT  STATEMENT 
PROPOSAL  FOR  A COUNCIL  DIRECTIVE  ON  CAPITAL  ADEQUACY 
OF  INVESTMENT  FIRMS  AND  CREDIT  INSTITUTIONS 
What  Is  the main  reason  for  Introducing  the  measure? 
The  main  reason  for  Introducing  the measure  Is  to ensure  that 
consumers  of  financial .services  are  adequately  protected  by  Imposing 
minimum  capital  requirements on  Investment  firms. 
II.  Features of  the  businesses  In  auestlon 
The  scope of  the  proposal  covers credit  Institutions and  non-
bank  Investment  firms  which  are  dealers  or  brokers  In  securities,  as 
wei  I  as portfol lo  managers  and  Investment  advisers. 
a)  There  are  many  SMEs,  mainly  In  the  United  Kingdom. 
b)  There  Is  no  particular  regional  concentration. - 47  -
Ill.  What  direct  obllqat Ions  does  this  measure  Impose  on 
businesses? 
Businesses  are  reQuired  ..  to  comply  with  reQuirements  relating 
to  minimum  start-up  capital  which  varies  with  the  type  of  risk 
resulting  from  the  activities  the  firm  Is carrying out. 
For  I  ow-r I  sic  actIvItIes,  such  as  l nvestment  adv l ce  only. or 
"locals",  there  Is  no  Initial  or  on-going  capital  requirement. 
(Locals  are  members  of  financial  futures  or  options  exchanges  whose 
transactions  are  guaranteed  by  other  member  firms  of  the  exchange.) 
The  genera I  start-up  capIta I  Is  set  at  ECU  500  000.  t.tember  States 
may  reduce  this  reQuirement  to  ECU  50  000  for  firms  which  do  not  hold 
customers'  money  or  securities, or  to  ECU  100  000  for  brokerage  firms 
which  hold  customers'  money  or  securities but  who  do  not  take  trading 
posIt Ions  for  theIr  own  account.  FIrms  a I ready  In  ex I  stance  before 
Implementation  of  the  directive  may  be  granted  an  exemption 
(grandfatherlng clause)  from  these  Initial  capital  reQuirements. 
Firms  will  also  have  to  meet  on-going  capital  requirements 
based  on  an  expenditure  measure  and  on  their  position  risk, 
counterparty  risk  and  foreign  exchange  risk.  These  risks  are 
strictly proportional  to  the size of  each  business  and  to  the size of 
the  risk  taken. 
IV.  What  Indirect  obligations  are  local  authorities 
likely  to  Impose  on  businesses? 
None - 48  -
v.  Are  there  any  soec!al  measures  In  respect  of  SMEs? 
Imp! lcltly  SMEs  wll I  be  the  malo  beneflclalres  of  the 
"grandfather log  clause"  concerning  Initial  capital,  as  we!  I  as of  the 
exception  for  "locals"  and  pure  Investment  advisers. 
VI.  What  1s  the  I lke!y effect  on: 
a)  the competlt!yeness of  businesses? 
Investment  f l rms ·  own  funds  shou! d  ref I  ect  the  rIsks  taken 
and  the  size  of  their  transactions.  This  should  Improve  their 
performance  and  reduce  their  fa! lure  rate. 
b)  employment? 
Because  of  the  "grandfather I  ng  c I  ause"  there  shou I  d  be  no 
reduct !On  In  the  number  of  a I ready  exIstIng  fIrms.  There  Is  II ke I  y 
to  be  some  reduction  In  the  number  of  new  entrants  as  not  a! I 
candidates  would  be  able  to  meet  the  Initial  capital  requirement  of 
ECU  50  ooo,  or  ECU  100  000.  This  effect  might,  however,  we!  I  be 
compensated  for  by  the  fact  that  a! I  authorised  firms  could  engage  In 
securities  business  throughout  the  Community  on  the  basis  of  home 
country  authorisation  and  supervision.  In  addition,  consumers  of 
financial  services  should  have  more  confidence  In  small  and  medium-
sized  Investment  firms,  knowing  that  they  are  likely  to  be 
sufficiently  capitalized  In  relation  to  the  size  of  their  business. 
The  survival  rate of  new  entrants should  Increase  because of  a  larger 
capacity  to absorb  losses. - 49  -
VII.  Haye  both  sides of  Industry  been  consulted? 
There  have  been  no  consultations  with  representatives  of 
employees. 
As  far  as -the  business  sector  Is  concerned,  there  have  been 
requests  made  to  the  Commission  by  representatives  of  the  financial 
futures  and  opt Ions  exchanges  In  France,  the  Nether I  ands  and  the 
United  Kingdom  In  favour  of  "locals".  These  demands  have  been  met  by 
the  exclusion  of  "locals"  from  Initial  and  on-going  capital 
requirements. 
In  addition,  there  have  been  requests  made  by  FIMBRA 
concerning  the  level  of  the  Initial  start-up  requirements.  These 
demands  have  been  met,  as  far  as  compatible  with  consumer  protection, 
by  excluding  pure  Investment  advisers  from  any  capital  requlremnets, 
by  providing  an  Intermediate  level  of  start-up capital  of  ECU  100  ooo 
for  brokers  who  do  not  take  positions,  and  by  the  "grandfatherlng 
clause"  for  existing  firms. EN 
PRICE 
.. 
ISSN 0254-1475 
COM(90)  141  final 
DOCUMENTS 
·':! 
18 
Catalogue number : CB-C0-90-249-.EN·C 
ISBN 92·77-60799-8 
1 - 30 pages: 3.50 ECU  per additionallO pages: 1.25 ECU 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 
L-2985 Luxembourg 